This paper measures the response of U
Introduction
Do tougher environmental regulations cause …rms to ‡ee the country? Although several studies document the impact of environmental regulation on domestic production, 1 the question of whether …rms increase foreign manufacturing in response to new domestic regulation has remained unanswered. Consequently, our understanding of the e¢ cacy of environmental policy is limited, as is our understanding of the distributional impacts of "local" environmental policies. In an attempt to o¤er evidence on this question, this paper uses …rm-level data and a di¤erences-in-di¤erences strategy to test whether …rms increase manufacturing abroad in response to tougher environmental regulations at home, with a particular focus on whether …rms shift manufacturing to developing countries, which typically have weaker environmental laws.
U.S. environmental regulations are often met with the claim that, by making domestic production more costly, they force …rms to shift manufacturing abroad. Firms can shift production through two possible mechanisms. First, a …rm may contract production to foreign manufacturing …rms (outsourcing). Second, a …rm may invest in foreign manufacturing facilities, and directly produce goods overseas (foreign direct investment, or FDI). While understanding both mechanisms is necessary to evaluate the e¤ects of local environmental regulation, the lack of data and the inherent di¢ culty of measuring a …rm's exposure to regulation have previously hindered rigorous statistical analysis of either mechanism.
This paper compiles detailed …rm-level regulation data to investigate the link between regulation and a …rm's foreign production decisions. Speci…cally, I test whether the Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA)-legislation that dramatically strengthened environmental regulation in the United States-resulted in increased foreign direct investment (FDI) by U.S. based multinational …rms. In addition, I evaluate claims that the regulations spurred …rms to disproportionately increase manufacturing in developing countries, which would have important distributional e¤ects.
I …nd evidence that the CAAA legislation increased the outbound FDI of U.S. based multinational …rms in dirty industries. In particular, the analysis in this paper suggests that the CAAA regulations caused multinationals to increase their foreign assets in polluting industries by 5.3% and their foreign output by 9%. Contrary to popular beliefs, heavily regulated …rms did not disproportionately increase production in developing nations relative to other countries.
Finally, there is limited evidence that heavily regulated U.S. multinationals increased imports from their foreign a¢ liates in response to regulation, and there is robust evidence that …rms reacted more strongly to regulation if they manufactured within an industry for which imports have historically accounted for a large percentage of U.S. consumption. Taken together, these results are consistent with the theory that regulation causes a …rm to substitute foreign for domestic production.
This paper contributes to the literature on the relationship between environmental regulation and FDI. Previous studies have mostly focused on the impact of a receiving country's (or state's) environmental stringency on inward FDI (Xing and Kolstad, 1998; Smarzynska and Wei, 2001; Mani, Huq, and Pargal, 1996; Levinson and Keller, 2002; Raspiller and Riedinger, 2004; Dean, Lovely, and Wang, 2004) . Eskeland and Harrison (1997) is a notable departure from the literature: their paper tests whether the pattern of outbound U.S. investment during the 1980s and early 1990s can be explained by variations in pollution abatement costs across di¤erent sectors of the U.S. economy. Both approaches have yielded mixed conclusions, and, for the most part, have failed to uncover robust evidence of industrial relocation in response to environmental regulation. However, this lack of evidence may be attributed to two factors. First, it is di¢ cult to measure environmental stringency across regions: in general, only broad measures of environmental stringency across host countries or states (participation in treaties, abatement costs)
are available, and these are often correlated with other factors important in attracting FDI.
Second, most environmental regulations apply to all manufacturing …rms in a country or all …rms in a particular industry, and therefore, it is quite di¢ cult to …nd a control group against which to evaluate the e¤ects of new regulations. Previous studies have typically tested whether the e¤ect of environmental stringency di¤ers across industries of varying pollution intensity, under the hypothesis that the regulation e¤ect on FDI is concentrated in polluting industries.
However, there have been concerns in the literature (Ja¤e, 1995; Smarzynska and Wei, 2001) that this strategy may potentially confound industry speci…c trends in FDI (such as oil shocks, recessions) with regulation.
This paper aims to overcome these limitations and establishes whether a causal relationship exists between environmental regulation and FDI. Following Eskeland and Harrison (1997) , I
analyze whether tougher environmental regulation at home increases outbound FDI. Rather than using industry-level measures of environmental stringency, this study exploits the plau-sibly exogenous variation in …rm-level regulation created by the Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA). Following their passage in 1970, the Environmental Protection Agency established separate national ambient air quality standards-a minimum level of quality that all U.S. counties are required to meet-for four criteria pollutants. Each year, counties whose air concentrations exceed federal standards for a speci…c pollutant receive a nonattainment designation for that pollutant, while counties that are in attainment of federal standards receive an attainment designation. Manufacturing plants that emit a criteria pollutant in a county designated nonattainment are subject to relatively tougher regulatory oversight than emitting plants in attainment counties.
The nature of the CAAA regulatory program allows for a modi…ed di¤erences-in-di¤erences approach to test whether …rms were more likely to expand their overseas manufacturing operations when the U.S. counties in which they operate fell into nonattainment and were, thereby, subject to tougher environmental oversight. In contrast to the previous literature, this approach allows for the estimation of regulation e¤ects that are purged of bias associated with industry speci…c trends. This is particularly important because, during this period, there were many factors (e.g. oil shocks, country liberalizations, technology changes) that may have had di¤erential impacts on industry-level FDI. In addition, because the CAAA induced substantial variation in the level of regulation faced by an individual …rm across time, I can compute the e¤ect of regulation that is independent of …rm speci…c characteristics (e.g. production process, …rm size) that may also potentially a¤ect FDI. As a result, this paper overcomes objections in the literature (for example, Zarsky, 1999 ) that earlier studies on the impact of environmental regulation ignored …rm speci…c e¤ects.
To implement this strategy, I take advantage of a con…dential, …rm-level dataset collected by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), of the U.S. Department of Commerce, on the activities of U.S. based multinational …rms. The data provide detailed information on the …-nancial and operating characteristics of U.S. …rms manufacturing abroad between the years 1966 to 1999. I augment this dataset with annual data on the four pollutant-speci…c, attainment/nonattainment designations for each U.S. County and with detailed data on the U.S.
operations of each multinational …rm.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the Clean Air Act Amendments and the conceptual framework. Section 3 describes the empirical strategy and data. Section 4 presents the estimation results, while Section 5 provides a discussion of the results. Section 6 concludes. County is o¢ cially reclassi…ed as being either in or out of attainment of the national standards for each of the criteria pollutants.
Relative to attainment counties, strict regulatory oversight is exerted on polluting manufacturers in nonattainment counties. When a county falls into nonattainment, the law requires its state to develop a State Implementation Plan (SIP), which lays out speci…c regulations for every major source of each pollutant for which the county is in nonattainment. The plans impose substantial regulations on both new and existing manufacturing facilities. In general, the SIPs stipulate that new investments or plant renovations must be paired with the installation of state-of-the art pollution abatement equipment. Existing plants are subject to "reasonably available control technologies," which usually involves retro…tting existing equipment. States may also dictate changes in an industry's production process, such as forcing existing printers in nonattainment counties to substitute highly polluting inks with more expensive, cleaner versions. Furthermore, the regulations make it more costly for an existing plant to modify its operations, as they require that the entire plant comply with current standards for new sources. In contrast, large-scale investments in attainment counties require relatively cheaper abatement equipment, and existing plants are essentially unregulated. 4 Non-polluters are free from regulation in both categories of counties.
In nonattainment counties, the regulations are vigorously enforced by both federal and state agencies, and violating manufacturers may face extensive "civil penalty plus recovery of any economic bene…t of non-compliance" and orders requiring the "correction of the violation." 4 New and modi…ed sources in attainment counties that emit large quantities of the criteria pollutant are subject to the "best available control technologies." However, this is negotiable for individual cases and, unlike the nonattainment counties, this is sensitive to economic burdens. 5 Enforcement e¤orts appear to have had "bite." The CAAA substantially a¤ected U.S. industrial activity. Cohen (1998) documents the e¤ectiveness of the regulations at the plant level.
A series of papers (for example, Kahn, 1997; Greenstone, 2002) show that the regulations retarded the growth of polluting manufacturers in nonattainment counties. Moreover, Becker and Henderson (2000) provide evidence that, controlling for socioeconomic conditions across counties, …rms were more likely to choose an attainment county for a new plant.
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Further evidence of the bite of the regulation can be found in …rm reactions: in 1997, the business community attempted (unsuccessfully) to lobby against the EPA's plans to alter ozone standards, which would have e¤ectively doubled the number of counties in nonattainment for ozone. 7 Lastly, perhaps the most compelling piece of evidence that the regulations are successfully enforced is the fact that air pollution concentrations declined at a relatively faster rate in nonattainment counties subsequent to the regulations (Henderson, 1996; Chay and Greenstone, 2003) .
Sources of Policy Variation
The particular structure of the CAAA regulatory program enables a compelling identi…cation strategy with which to determine the e¤ect of tougher environmental regulation on a …rm's foreign production decisions.
Most importantly, the regulations only apply to manufacturing facilities operating within nonattainment counties, inducing variation in the level of regulation across …rms. This allows me to compare the e¤ect of regulation across …rms within the same industry, and thus remove shocks (oil shocks, new technologies, recessions) common to a particular industry that may potentially be correlated with regulation.
Second, the policy was designed to ensure that all counties that achieve nonattainment status are similarly regulated. The CAAA emission standards are federally mandated and, thus, 6 Several papers found results contrary to Becker and Henderson (2000) . For example, Schwab and McConnell (1990) concluded that a county's nonattainment designation did not deter new plants in the motor vehicle industry. Their estimation strategy, though, did not account for the fact that counties are often in nonattainment because polluting plants have historically viewed them as productive, cost-e¤ective places to locate.
7 "Supreme Court Roundup: Justices Broaden their look at the Clean Air Act." New York Times, 2001. consistently applied throughout the country. Although individual states formulate separate enforcement policies, the EPA has su¢ cient mechanisms to ensure that each state similarly regulates polluting manufacturers. As a result, this eliminates the possibility that di¤erences in tastes or other characteristics across counties are potentially correlated with …rm production choices, thus biasing the estimated regulation e¤ects.
Another possible concern is that nonattainment and attainment counties may have di¤erent underlying socioeconomic conditions (such as population density, unionization rates), which may cause a spurious correlation between the probability that a county earns a nonattainment designation (high pollution) and the FDI of …rms operating within these counties. However, because non-emitting plants are not subject to CAAA regulation in either type of county, I
can isolate changes in the FDI outcomes of non-emitting …rms across U.S. counties to remove the e¤ect of manufacturing in a nonattainment county that is independent of regulation. In addition, because a county's designation varies over time, I can control for di¤erences between counties over time, ensuring that time varying factors common to nonattainment counties (wage growth, population growth) are not confounded with the e¤ects of regulation.
Finally, the designation of nonattainment status is reevaluated annually. A …rm that is subject to varying levels of regulation at di¤erent points in time can be followed, thereby allowing the paper to include estimates that are derived from within a …rm. This methodology ensures that …rm speci…c factors (…rm size, production technologies) do not drive the results.
Conceptual Framework
The results presented in this paper provide a good measure of the e¤ect of the CAAA regulatory program on U.S. outbound FDI, as the program is currently written. However, the results may underestimate the overall e¤ect of environmental regulation, and this should be taken into account when generalizing them to other settings.
The identi…cation strategy relies on the comparison of …rms across U.S. counties with varying regulation levels. Regulation increases the expected costs of production, and if these costs become prohibitively high, a …rm might relocate. In this case, a …rm has two options: move to another (less regulated) U.S. county or move abroad. Quite simply, if the expected pro…ts of foreign production exceed the pro…ts of producing within another U.S. county, the …rm will move abroad; otherwise the …rm will relocate within the United States.
The estimated regulation e¤ect, therefore, measures the actual change in FDI that results from the CAAA regulation. However, some …rms residing in high regulation counties will shift production to low regulation counties rather than moving abroad (and some …rms in low regulation counties will shift production abroad in response to regulation). Therefore, this strategy provides a lower bound of the e¤ect of regulation had it been equally implemented across the United States. The extent to which this lower bound underestimates the overall e¤ect depends on the magnitude of …rms that switched to another U.S. county.
There are numerous reasons why the expected costs of foreign production may be greater than the costs of producing in another county, and each reason has di¤erent implications for the interpretation of the estimated regulation e¤ect. For example, consider a world with adjustment costs, where …rms cannot instantaneously react to regulation. A …rm may be unwilling to pay the costs of relocating to another U.S. county that, though unregulated today, has a nonzero probability of future regulation. In this case, the bias of the regulation e¤ect would be smaller than the case where it is costless for a …rm to shift between U.S. counties.
Finally, consider the most extreme scenario: it is possible that the expected costs of U.S.
regulation are su¢ ciently high that all U.S. …rms would prefer shifting production abroad.
However, in the short run, only …rms for whom the expected compliance costs exceed the adjustment costs will relocate. Firms would never shift production to another U.S. county.
Thus, the empirical strategy would provide an unbiased estimate of the short-run e¤ect of environmental regulation (in the long run, regulation would force all …rms abroad).
In summary, this paper measures the actual outsourcing e¤ects of U.S. environmental policy during the last 40 years. Furthermore, the estimated results can be viewed as a lower bound on the overall e¤ect of environmental regulation on …rm behavior, helping us to better understand the welfare consequences of country-level environmental policies.
Empirical Strategy
In this section, I …rst describe the regression framework. Next, I discuss the construction of the CAAA regulation variable. I conclude with a detailed description of the data.
Regression Framework
This paper employs a modi…ed di¤erences-in-di¤erences approach to determine the e¤ect of CAAA regulation on the foreign manufacturing operations of U.S. based multinationals. In particular, I test whether …rms were more likely to increase foreign production within an industry if a large share of their U.S. manufacturing facilities (in that industry) were regulated.
Multinational …rms regularly operate in multiple industries, making it di¢ cult to classify a …rm as belonging only to a "dirty" or "clean" industry. To address this issue, I disaggregate both the regulation data and foreign investment data to the level of a …rm (indexed by f) by industry segment (indexed by i). The panel structure of the data allows me to follow these segments across years (indexed by t). In a given year, an individual …rm may have up to 45 industrial segments. The baseline empirical speci…cation is as follows:
where (t-k) indexes the most recent year for which FDI data was available. Y f it is a measure of a …rm's direct foreign production within an industrial segment (including capital stock, output, and sales). " f it is the stochastic error term.
Reg f i(t k) is a lagged measure of a …rm-industry's exposure to CAAA regulation, for any pollutant. Speci…cally, it is the lagged percentage of a …rm's U.S. plants that were e¤ectively regulated under the CAAA within an industrial segment, where an individual manufacturing plant is considered "regulated" if the U.S. plant is in a dirty industry and located in a nonattainment county. The construction of Reg f i(t k) is discussed in detail in Section 3.2.
Ind f i(t k) is a vector of "industries at home"dummy variables that indicate whether a …rm manufactured within a domestic industry in a given year, and whose e¤ects are time varying to capture shocks common to …rms manufacturing in a particular U.S. industry. These variables remove the main e¤ect of manufacturing in a domestic industry.
Non f i(t k) is a vector of variables that give the proportion of a …rm's U.S. manufacturing facilities, in an industrial segment, that are located in a nonattainment county, by year. Non f i(t k) parametrically controls for the main e¤ect of manufacturing in a nonattainment county. This is especially important because operating within a nonattainment county may a¤ect FDI independently of regulation if counties in nonattainment systematically di¤er than those in attainment (for example, counties that are in nonattainment di¤er from those in attainment in observable characteristics such as rates of unionization and average education level).
It is important to note that Non f i(t k) constrains the main e¤ect of manufacturing in a nonattainment county to be identical across counties. I would ideally relax this restriction and include a vector of time varying, county …xed e¤ects. However, given the number of observations, I cannot control for the ensuing 18,000 countyyear …xed e¤ects. Nonetheless, since the emission standards (and policy implementation) are the same for each nonattainment county, the main threat to the estimation strategy comes from di¤erences in trends between …rms manufacturing in nonattainment and attainment counties, not between particular counties. Consequently, this restriction should not signi…cantly alter the results.
The panel structure of the data allows for additional controls that purge the regulation e¤ect of bias associated with industry and …rm speci…c trends, which may be potentially correlated with regulation. Speci…cally, I include …rm by industry ( f i ), industry by year ( it ) and …rm by time ( f t ) …xed e¤ects. The inclusion of industry by year …xed e¤ects ( it ) removes shocks to FDI that are common to all …rms investing abroad within an industry in a particular year. Including industries by year …xed e¤ects is especially important if certain industries increased FDI during this period for reasons unrelated to environmental regulation (e.g. the U.S. automobile industry signi…cantly shifted production to Mexico after NAFTA).
Firm by year …xed e¤ects ( f t ) remove the mean FDI across all of a …rm's industrial segments in a particular year. This controls for unobserved factors that equally a¤ect FDI across a …rm's polluting and nonpolluting segments (e.g. a change in a …rm's credit ratings or senior management).
Finally, …rm by industry …xed e¤ects ( f i ) absorb the unobserved heterogeneity in the determinants to FDI that are common to a particular industry within a given …rm. In e¤ect, this allows a …rm-industry that is unregulated in one period to act as a comparison group for itself when regulated in other periods. These controls are important if we believe that a …rm-industry's exposure to regulation is potentially correlated with factors inherent to a …rm-industry (such as technology or size).
The parameter of interest, 3 , measures the e¤ect of belonging to a domestic, polluting industry and the degree to which a …rm-industry operates in nonattainment counties on a …rm's FDI. In the simplest case, where each …rm manufactures in only one industry and one county in the United States, this speci…cation would reduce to a simple di¤erences-in-di¤erences model, where Reg f it is a dummy variable indicating whether the …rm-industry was regulated and 3 captures the variation in foreign production speci…c to …rms in domestic, polluting industries (relative to non-polluters) in nonattainment counties (relative to attainment ones). However, in any given year, a …rm may operate in multiple U.S. Counties (the average multinational in the sample manufactures in 6 U.S. Counties per year). Rather than simply indicating whether the …rm-industry is regulated, the regulation variable measures the percentage of a …rm-industry's U.S. operations that are regulated, thereby allowing the model to fully exploit di¤erences in a …rm-industry's exposure to regulation.
In summary, the estimated regulation e¤ects are purged of many likely sources of bias associated with transitory shocks to an industry, inherent …rm by industry characteristics, and transitory shocks to a …rm. However, the estimated regulation e¤ects are not robust to transitory determinants of FDI speci…c to …rms in dirty industries that are primarily located in nonattainment counties. In other words, the results are subject to bias if we believe that the main e¤ect of manufacturing in a nonattainment county di¤ers for …rms in clean and dirty industries.
Measuring Environmental Regulation
This section details the construction of the …rm by industry regulation variable, Reg f it , and how the assumptions underlying its construction a¤ect the interpretation of the empirical results.
I compute Reg f it as the percentage of a …rm's U.S. plants, within each industrial segment, that were e¤ectively regulated for any pollutant under the CAAA. For each of the four criteria pollutants, I divide industries into two categories: emitting and non-emitting. I follow Greenstone (2002) and de…ne an industry as pollutant-emitting if the industry contributed 7% or more to total industrial emissions of the pollutant (Table 1) . Using this rule, U.S. plants manufacturing in emitting industries collectively account for between 72 and 91% of the total U.S. industrial emissions of each criteria pollutant.
I de…ne an individual plant p as regulated for pollutant z if it belongs to an industry i that emits z (Ind piz =1), and it is located in a county c that is in nonattainment for pollutant z at given time t (N onattain pctz =1):
where z belongs to the set of criteria pollutants {CO, O 3 , SO 2 , TSP}. Accordingly, I de…ne a plant as regulated for any pollutant if the following condition is satis…ed:
For each …rm "f" by industry "i" by year "t," I sum the number of regulated U.S. plants and divide this by the number of a …rm's U.S. plants in that industry (N f it ). This gives the percentage of a …rm's U.S. plants that were regulated within each of its industrial segments:
where () is an indicator function which takes the value of 1 if the U.S. plant faces regulation for at least one pollutant. The remainder of this section highlights several core assumptions implicit in the construction of Reg f it . First, Reg f it restricts the e¤ect of regulation in non-emitting industries to be zero.
As a result, the estimated regulation e¤ect heavily relies on the cuto¤ used to divide industries into the emitting and non-emitting categories. The sensitivity of the result to the 7% cuto¤ is explored in Section 4.7.
Second, the regulation variable assumes that all manufacturing plants within an emitting industry actually emit that pollutant and may, therefore, be a¤ected by regulation (and, simi- larly, that all manufacturing plants in non-emitting industries do not emit and are unregulated).
For the most part, plant-level emissions data are unavailable, hindering the classi…cation of individual plants as emitters or non-emitters. 11 However, even if these data were available, it is unclear whether plant-level emissions data would provide a better estimate of an individual plant's exposure to regulation. Plants in nonattainment counties are required to reduce emissions. A plant that has reduced emissions in response to regulation may be incorrectly labeled as a non-emitter, and thus wrongly classi…ed as unregulated.
Third, because I count each plant only once in Reg f it , I implicitly assume that the average costs of regulation are identical for each plant, regardless of the number of pollutants for which the plant faces regulation. Furthermore, each pollutant is weighted equally in Reg f it . Thus, I
assume that the average compliance costs of regulation are identical for each pollutant. Section 4.5 relaxes both these assumptions by allowing each of the four regulatory programs to impact foreign production separately.
Finally, I assume that each plant a¤ects a …rm's foreign investment decisions regardless of individual characteristics of the plant (plant size, age of the plant). In Section 4.7, I construct an alternative measure of a …rm's exposure to regulation as a function of plant characteristics.
Data
This paper brings together a variety of data sources to determine the impact of domestic environmental regulations on the foreign manufacturing outcomes of U.S. multinational …rms.
This section describes the sources and structure of the data.
Regulation Data
The attainment/nonattainment data are taken from the Code of Federal Regulations and the EPA's national pollution monitoring network. 
Foreign Direct Investment Data
Foreign manufacturing outcomes are obtained from con…dential, a¢ liate level data collected by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) of the U.S. Department of Commerce on the activities of U.S. based multinational …rms. A multinational …rm is de…ned as the combination of a single U.S. entity that has made the direct investment, called the U.S. parent, and at least one 12 Michael Greenstone generously provided these data. 13 The 1972-1977 estimated data are an underestimate of the scope of the regulations. Many counties lacked pollution monitoring equipment. In this case, a county was labeled as in "attainment." In the robustness section, I explore the sensitivity of the results to the estimated data; as a preview, the results remain unchanged.
14 Prior to 1979, the ozone standard prohibited the second highest daily maximum concentration from exceeding .08 parts per million. In 1979, the standard dropped to .12, partly explaining the subsequent decline in ozone-nonattainment counties. The BEA surveys can be linked across years, creating a comprehensive panel on the …nancial and operating characteristics of U.S. …rms manufacturing abroad. Extensive data are available for 1966, 15 1977, 1982, 1989, 1994, and 1999 , when the BEA conducted benchmark surveys.
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The selection criterion for the survey varied across years, causing the data to be censored. In 1966, all foreign a¢ liates with sales, assets, or net income in excess of $50000 in absolute value were required to report to the BEA. The cuto¤ jumped to $0. 16 Starting in 1983, annual surveys were conducted, but since the cuto¤ for participation was signi…cantly higher than in benchmark years, the annual surveys were not used in the analysis. 17 The rise in the cuto¤ is attributed to paperwork reduction laws. 18 The level of assets falling below the cuto¤ comprises a minimal percentage (0.38%) of total assets abroad, suggesting that the bottom-coding problem is negligible (estimated from the 1999 FDI data). Nonetheless, missing "middle" years were interpolated to mitigate problems associated with censored data. The percentage of interpolated data is low (less than .5% of the …rm-industry-year observations), and the results are robust to the interpolation. 19 Industrial classi…cations are based on ISI classi…cations, giving 45 industries in manufacturing.
or income in that year. An analysis using only these data would fail to capture, for example, a heavily regulated multinational …rm that did not produce abroad in a given year, biasing the estimated regulation e¤ects upwards. To remove this potential bias, I completed the panel: for each …rm, I obtained the birth and closure dates from a variety of electronic and print sources.
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If a …rm operated in the United States in a given year, but was absent from the survey data, I
assigned the …rm "zero" FDI for that year. As such, the empirical work presented in this paper captures both channels through which regulation impacts a multinational's foreign production choices. First, the analysis captures whether a …rm will move abroad in response to regulation or, in other words, whether a …rm will become a multinational. Second, it determines whether a …rm that already produces abroad will increase its foreign production activities in response to regulation.
This study does not include …rms that never produced abroad between the years of 1966 and 1999. Thus, while the regulation e¤ects derived in this paper provide a good estimate of a multinational's response to regulation, the e¤ects are most likely an overstatement for the entire universe of …rms. However, from a policy standpoint, we care most about the multinational response to regulation. Other …rms have such high barriers to foreign production that realistic levels of regulation may never cause them to produce abroad.
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Figures 2A and 2B graph the foreign assets allocated to manufacturing by U.S. based multinationals overall and excluding high income, OECD countries for the years 1966-1999. 22 The …gures split foreign assets by pollution-intensive industries versus clean industries. After 1982, foreign assets in clean industries grew at a relatively faster rate. This is not surprising, as it has been suggested that, due to the nature of their technologies, industries with the largest pollution abatement costs also happen to be the least footloose (Ederington, Levinson and Minier, 2003) . The …gures illustrate that the trend in FDI for pollution intensive and clean industries di¤ers, implying that an analysis simply comparing the e¤ect of environmental regulations on FDI across industries may su¤er from bias associated with these trends. 20 Firm births and closures were mainly taken from various volumes of Moody's Industrials and …rm websites. These data sources were supplemented by Hoover's Company Database, bankruptcy articles, and several additional sources. The 5% of …rms who were either missing a birth date, closure date, or both, were assigned to be operating for the duration in which investment data was available.
21 To obtain data on …rms that had never invested abroad during this period, I matched Compustat to the BEA data. However, the match was poor for a variety of reasons. First, the BEA data includes private …rms, while Compustat does not. Second, the Compustat data for the 1960s and 1970s was not comprehensive. Third, the level of …rm level aggregation di¤ers between the two data sets. The e¤ective match rate between Compustat and the BEA data was about 50%. Due to these data limitations and the di¤erences in observable characteristics between multinationals and other …rms, I decided to limit the analysis to multinationals.
22 I use the World Bank de…nition for high income, OECD country.
Plant Data
To compute the regulation variable, I use data on the location and the industry of a …rm's U.S. manufacturing facilities. I manually matched the …rms in the BEA foreign investment data to detailed U.S. manufacturing facility data. The Census Bureau's Census of Manufacturing is the most comprehensive facility level data collected, but it was unavailable for this study. from the analysis. Out of the remaining …rms, 67% (2235) were matched to at least one manufacturing plant. 26 The …nal sample was drawn from these 2235 …rms.
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics for the main variables are shown in Table 2 within an industry in a given year (Ind f i(t k) ).
The …rst two columns of Table 2 include FDI in all countries, while the second two columns exclude FDI to high income, OECD Nations. Several key patterns emerge from the table. First, the level of multinational activity in high income countries dwarfs the activity in other nations.
For example, the average …rm-industry's foreign assets excluding high income countries (7612) is less than a quarter of all foreign assets (37118).
Second, a …rm-industry that hold assets abroad in a given year is more likely to be regulated in the past (7% of plants regulated) than the overall average (6%). However, because of variation in the regulation variable, I cannot reject that the hypothesis that this di¤erence is zero.
Finally, the Ozone (O 3 ) program was most pervasive, and, therefore, it follows that the average …rm-industry is disproportionately regulated for O 3 (5.35%).
Regression Results
I begin by presenting regression results on the e¤ect of …rm by industry regulation on foreign assets (Section 4.1) and other selected outcome measures (Section 4.2). Second, I test whether U.S. regulation causes …rms to disproportionately move to developing countries (Section 4.3).
Third, I determine whether the impact of regulation varies by pollutant (Section 4.4) and whether the impact is larger for certain industries (Section 4.5). Fourth, I aggregate the …rm-industry data to the level of the …rm in order to determine whether …rm-level regulation a¤ects FDI (Section 4.6). I conclude with a series of speci…cation checks (Section 4.7). 26 The majority of unmatched …rms listed their primary SIC codes as nonmanufacturing.
The Effect of the CAAA on Foreign Assets
This section documents the impact of the CAAA on a …rm's foreign assets in its polluting segments. I …rst present the results using only the cross-sectional variation in the data, and then present the full panel analysis. includes the mean elasticity of the regulation. The columns correspond to speci…cations that include di¤erent sets of controls; the exact controls are noted at the bottom of the table. As the regulation e¤ects are derived from the interaction of manufacturing in a heavily polluting industry in the United States and residing in a nonattainment county, the main e¤ects of manufacturing in a domestic industry (Ind f i(t k) ) and manufacturing in a nonattainment county (Non f i(t k) ) are always included. The mean foreign assets for a …rm-industry is $37,188,000.
The Column 1 speci…cation presents the estimated regulation e¤ect from exploiting the pooled cross-sectional variation in the data. In other words, I exclude …rm by industry, industry by year, and …rm by year …xed e¤ects. The estimated e¤ect of regulation is large (735.35) and highly signi…cant. 27 The Column 2 speci…cation adds industry by year …xed e¤ects ( it ), which purge the estimated regulation e¤ects of all transitory di¤erences in the mean foreign assets across industries. This estimate is not signi…cantly di¤erent than the estimate presented in Column 1. However, …rms tend to invest abroad in industries in which they manufacture at home, and therefore the industry at home variables included in the speci…cation in Column 1 (Ind f i(t k) ) may have already captured the trend in FDI, by foreign industry.
In the speci…cations presented in Columns 1 and 2, the estimated regulation e¤ect may simply capture the di¤erence in FDI between …rms. For example, suppose that larger …rms are more likely to be regulated and more likely to manufacture abroad. Then, the estimated coe¢ cient would potentially confound the regulation e¤ect with …rm size. In the speci…cation reported in Column 3, I take advantage of the panel structure of the data and include …rm by industry …xed e¤ects. The estimate of 3 falls from 735 in Column 2 to 320 in Column 3. This di¤erence suggests that …rm speci…c factors are an important determinant of FDI, 27 Constraining the e¤ect of the industries at home and nonattainment variables to be constant over time produced similar results to Table 4A , but are omitted for brevity. All omitted results can be obtained from the author upon request. and therefore, estimates of the regulation e¤ect using cross-sectional data, where it is di¢ cult to control for unobserved factors across …rm by industry groups, may overstate the e¤ect of environmental regulation on FDI.
Column 4 reports results from including industry by year, …rm by industry, and …rm by year …xed e¤ects. 28 In this speci…cation, the coe¢ cient estimate on regulation is purged of possible sources of bias associated with transitory shocks to an industry, inherent …rm by industry characteristics, and transitory shocks to a …rm. The estimate of 3 , which is similar to Column 3, indicates that a 1 percentage point increase in the lagged percentage of plants regulated in an industry leads to a $329,000 increase in a …rm's stock of foreign assets in that industry (signi…cant at the 5% level). This corresponds to a 0.9% increase in foreign assets for the average …rm-industry. To put these numbers into context, suppose that the average level of regulation is imposed upon a previously unregulated …rm-industry (i.e. 6% of a …rm-industry's plants are now regulated). The model predicts that the …rm would increase its foreign assets in that industrial segment by 5.3%.
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The estimated regulation e¤ect captures two channels through which regulation may a¤ect FDI: by inducing a …rm to invest abroad the …rst time and by motivating a …rm to increase manufacturing at a previously existing plant. I estimated the e¤ect of regulation on a dummy variable for whether the …rm-industry manufactured abroad in a given year. The results (not shown here) suggest that regulations do not increase the probability that a …rm will invest abroad. Rather, regulation causes …rms to increase manufacturing at already existing manufacturing plants.
Potential (spurious) correlations may exist between regulation and a …rm's foreign assets in an industry, if the total number of U.S. plants a …rm-industry operates in a given year is correlated with its foreign assets. Speci…cally, operating more plants raises the probability of operating a plant in a nonattainment county, while simultaneously decreasing the probability of operating only "regulated"plants. Firm by industry …xed e¤ects control for these correlations between …rms (as they remove average …rm by industry characteristics), but do not control for changes within a …rm (since the number of plants a …rm operates can change over time).
Similarly, the …rm by time …xed e¤ects control for plant growth across all of a …rm's industrial 28 For computational ease, the data are demeaned using the two-way …xed e¤ects model, and standard errors are appropriately adjusted. 29 The regressions were run on the level of assets, and the mean elasticity of regulation is presented. Transforming the data by the log function would constrain the e¤ect of regulation to be proportional to the …rm's foreign assets, ensuring that the magnitude of the regulation e¤ect was not simply driven by the largest …rms. However, the data include a large fraction of zeros for years in which the …rms did not invest abroad in an industry, and therefore, the log function is not appropriate.
segments, but do not control for disproportionate plant growth in one segment. To test whether this potential correlation drives the results, the speci…cation in Column 5 controls for the lagged number of plants a …rm operates in a given year. The results remain virtually unchanged. I conclude this section by presenting the estimated coe¢ cients of the CAAA under an alternative assumption regarding the timing of regulation e¤ects on FDI. The regulation measure in Table 3 Table A1 ). The point estimates presented
in Table A1 are not signi…cantly di¤erent than those presented in Table 3 .
The Effect of the CAAA on Other Foreign Production Outcomes
This section documents the e¤ect of the CAAA regulation on other measures of foreign production. Table 4 presents the results from the speci…cation that controls for …rm by industry, …rm by year, and industry by year …xed e¤ects. Therefore, the estimated regulation coe¢ cients are comparable with Table 3 , Column 4. For ease of interpretation, the mean elasticity of regulation is also presented.
Column 1 reports the estimation results for an alternative measure of a …rm's capital stock:
plant and property expenditures (PPE). In addition to including the physical capital stock of the foreign a¢ liate, the asset variable includes the a¢ liate's equity investments in other …rms.
In contrast, the PPE measure only includes the physical capital stock (land, machinery, etc), perhaps providing a less noisy measure of foreign production activities. The coe¢ cient on regulation is positive (125) and signi…cant at the 1% level.
Next, I investigate the e¤ect of regulation on a multinational's foreign output. Although changes in a …rm's foreign capital stock may provide evidence on permanent changes in foreign production, they may not capture transitory changes in foreign manufacturing during a given year. Suppose that a …rm's manufacturing facility operates at less than full capacity. 31 A …rm 30 Berman and Bui (1998 and 2001) document that the plant level regulations associated with nonattainment status often set compliance dates a number of years in advance. 31 It has been well documented that many plants operate under capacity, and that capacity utilization movements are not random, but can be viewed as systematic results of a rational economic optimization process undertaken by the …rm. In particular, multifactor productivity tends to be procyclical (Berndt and Morrison, may, thus, increase production by more fully utilizing existing capital structures, rather than investing in new equipment. In this case, using the foreign capital stock as a measure of foreign production would cause a downward biased measure of the regulation e¤ect. In addition, the assets and PPE variables are recorded through a book value system. This system permanently records the value of an investment at its purchase price, and the value is never updated to re ‡ect in ‡ation or changes in the goods market value. Because this system overstates the relative contribution of a recent investment (which is entered in current dollars), the increase in foreign capital as a fraction of total capital may be an upwardly biased measure of current production levels. A …rm's foreign output does not su¤er from either bias, and, therefore, may provide a better measure of transitory changes in production.
Column 2 and 3 report the estimation results for two measures foreign output: the real expenditures on foreign goods and services and the real foreign Gross Product, respectively.
Once again, 3 is positive and signi…cant (point estimates of 702 and 290, and mean elasticities of 1.5 and 2.1 respectively). This implies that imposing the mean level of …rm by industry regulation causes the average …rm to increase its foreign output (as measured by the expenditures on goods and services) by roughly 9% within a polluting industry.
In Column 4, I test whether a …rm increases imports from its foreign a¢ liates in response to tougher environmental regulation. A …rm may utilize FDI as a means of penetrating a local market, or, alternatively, to produce goods for export. In the context of this study, it is interesting to understand whether the United States was the …nal destination of the additional foreign goods produced in response to regulation, and hence whether imports substituted domestic production. It is worth mentioning that although a foreign a¢ liate can export directly to other companies within the United States, roughly one-third of world trade is intra-…rm trade (Antras, 2003) and, in our particular sample, sales to the U.S. parent …rm account for 62% of all sales to the United States. As such, this is an important indicator of whether a …rm substitutes foreign goods for its own domestic production. The e¤ect of regulation on intra-…rm trade is positive (131) and economically signi…cant: a 1 percentage point increase in regulation leads to 1.6% increase in imports by the average …rm by industry. However, this is not precisely estimated.
Finally, Column 5 reports the estimation result where the real sales from the foreign a¢ liate to the United States, through any …rm, is the dependent variable; the coe¢ cient is positive (99), but not precisely estimated.
1981; Morrison 1985).

The Relative Impacts of Regulation on FDI to Developing Countries
This section addresses whether environmental regulations alter the international location decisions of polluters. In particular, opponents of U.S. environmental regulation fear that regulation forces …rms to shift manufacturing to developing countries, which are generally less able or less willing to impose tough environmental policies (pollution havens or race to the bottom e¤ects).
If this concern is justi…ed, U.S. environmental policies may have signi…cant distributional impacts, as pollution and jobs shift to developing nations.
Economic theory, however, does not necessarily predict that …rms will disproportionately increase investment to developing nations. The regulations do not alter conditions (interest rates, costs) across foreign nations, and therefore, at the margin, we would not automatically expect a change in the distribution of a …rm's foreign portfolio. Furthermore, even if the regulations motivate a …rm to invest in countries with weaker standards, the …rm may not necessarily increase production in a developing country. A …rm's location choice depends upon a variety of factors that a¤ect the business environment, of which environmental law is only one; for example, a …rm that requires a ‡exible workforce might not invest in a country that has the weakest environmental laws if it also has the most rigid labor laws.
The empirical evidence on whether multinationals invest in developing nations to exploit weaker environmental policies is mixed. Gamper-Rabindran and Jha (2004) show that after India's 1991 liberalization, there were greater in ‡ows of FDI into dirty industries relative to cleaner ones. On the other hand, Eskeland and Harrison (1997) In Figure 4 , I plot the average ratio of foreign assets in developing nations to total foreign assets, by polluting and clean industries. For all years, the ratio is higher for clean industries.
There is not a discernible change in the di¤erence in ratios over time, con…rming Eskeland and Harrison's result that dirty U.S. industries are not disproportionately increasing their concentration in developing countries.
In Table 5 and 6, I present statistical evidence on whether …rms will relocate to developing countries when they are faced with more stringent environmental regulation. Table 5 replicates the regression results presented in Table 3 and 4, excluding FDI to high-income, OECD countries. I …nd evidence that multinationals invest in developing countries when faced with higher levels of U.S. regulation. For example, a 1 percentage point increase in the lagged percentage of regulated plants corresponds to a $59,000 (for the average …rm, 0.8%) increase in the stock of foreign assets within a …rm's polluting segment. This estimate is signi…cant at the 15% level.
However, the mean elasticity of foreign assets to regulation in developing countries (0.8%) is not noticeably di¤erent than the mean elasticity (0.9%) for all countries. Table 6 presents a formal test of whether multinationals disproportionately increase FDI to the developing world in response to regulation. I re-estimate equation 1 with the ratio of FDI in less developed countries to total FDI as the dependent variable. For each outcome measure, the mean of the dependent variable is listed in brackets at the top of the table. Across all outcomes, the results are indistinguishable from zero, implying that the share of a …rm's investment in poorer countries is not determined by U.S. environmental regulations. (158) is cheaper than SO 2 (285).
Individual Pollutants
As a result, it is di¢ cult to rank individual pollutants by their marginal abatement costs.
More recent evidence suggests that, in practice, the CO regulatory program disproportionately retarded the growth of manufacturing (Greenstone, 2002) . This implies that it may be the most costly of the four regulatory regimes.
In order to estimate the separate e¤ects of each regulatory program on foreign production, I compute four measures of pollutant speci…c regulation:
This measure is similar in attributes to Reg f it , and can be interpreted as the percentage of a …rm's U.S. plants in an industrial segment that are regulated for pollutant Z.
For each pollutant, I estimate Equation 1, replacing Reg f i(t k) with the pollutant-speci…c measure of …rm by industry regulation:
Note that Equation 2 di¤ers from Equation 1 in that Non f i(t k) has been replaced by NonZ f i(t k) , which is de…ned as the percentage of plants in a nonattainment county for pollutant Z.
Columns 1 -4 of Table 7 
Column 5 presents the estimates of the coe¢ cients of interest ( 3CO , 3O 3 , 3SO 2 , and 3T SP ) from Equation 3. Once again, CO and O 3 regulation have signi…cant e¤ects on FDI, while the estimated e¤ect of TSP and SO 2 regulation are indistinguishable from zero. The estimates do not signi…cantly di¤er from estimating the e¤ect of each regulatory regime separately, suggesting that the marginal e¤ect of regulation for a second pollutant is equal to the average e¤ect of being regulated for that pollutant.
Overall, the results found in this exercise are consistent with prior work: the previous literature found that CO regulation had the largest e¤ect on domestic production, and therefore, we would also expect CO regulation to have the largest impact on foreign production. Moreover, the O 3 program was the most prevalent regulatory program within the United States, with the largest number of counties a¤ected. A …rm trying to evade regulation would have least incentive to switch counties within the United States, as the probability of a county falling into nonattainment for O 3 is higher than for other pollutants.
Exploring the Heterogeneity across Industries
In this section, I explore whether the e¤ect of environmental regulation varies across industrial characteristics. In particular, I focus on whether the regulation e¤ect varies with the extent of an industry's import penetration within the United States.
Industries with high import penetration, roughly de…ned as the ratio of imports to domestic production, may react substantially more to regulation for a variety of reasons: less protective measures of trade, a U.S. comparative disadvantage in that industry, etc. Using the NBER trade database, I construct a measure of import penetration as the ratio of the value of U.S. imports to the value of U.S. shipments, by industry (IMPEN i ). To smooth temporary ‡uctuations, the ratio is averaged over eight years (1958) (1959) (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) . I then interact IMPEN i with the …rm by industry environmental regulation variable (Reg f i(t k) ):
The parameter of interest, 33 , captures the additional impact of regulation for high import penetration industries (Pulp and Paper, Petrol Re…ning, Lumber) relative to low import penetration industries (Newspapers, Fabricated Metals). Table 9 presents the results from estimating Equation 4 for selected outcome measures.
Column 1 presents the results where the dependent variable is a …rm-industry's foreign assets;
33 is positive (86) and signi…cant. This implies that regulation has larger e¤ects for …rms in dirty, high import penetration industries relative to dirty, low importation industries.
In Column 2, I replace the import penetration ratio with a dummy variable indicating whether the industry is above median import penetration. The results are striking-the e¤ects of regulation can be predominately attributed to high import penetration industries (629).
Columns 3 and 4 present the coe¢ cient estimates based on the speci…cations where the expenditures on foreign goods and services is the dependent variable, while Columns 5 and 6 present them for intra-…rm trade. These results indicate that …rms increase foreign output in response to regulation relatively more in industries in which imports have historically accounted for a large percentage of U.S. consumption.
Firm Level Regression
As an alternative strategy, I estimate the e¤ect of regulation on a …rm's total foreign production, rather than the e¤ect on a …rm's production within an industrial segment. In particular, I …t the following equation to …rm level data:
where Reg f (t k) is the lagged percentage of a …rm's U.S. plants under regulation, Ind f (t k) is a vector of dummies that control for the …rm's domestic industries, N on f (t k) controls for the percentage of plants a …rm has in a nonattainment county, f is a …rm …xed e¤ect and t is a year …xed e¤ect.
Regulation e¤ects calculated at the level of the …rm can be informative if there are spillover e¤ects from dirty to clean industries. Foreign investment tends to be lumpy, primarily due to the …xed costs of investing abroad. If a …rm facing tougher regulation at home is more likely to pay the …xed costs of creating infrastructure abroad, it may be easier for that …rm to manufacture across all industries. However, the …rm-level results may be misleading if regulated …rms shift simply foreign resources from clean to dirty industries. In this case, even if total foreign production remained constant, a reallocation between industries would have considerable e¤ects on pollution patterns and welfare.
The results of the …rm level regressions are presented in Table 9 . An increase in CAAA regulation causes a signi…cant increase in the total foreign capital stock and foreign output of a …rm; the e¤ect on sales is indistinguishable from zero.
Specification Checks
I probed the robustness of the estimates to determine the sensitivity of the results (Table 10 ), but I found little evidence contradicting the basic conclusions of this paper. Each cell is the coe¢ cient estimate of 3 from Equation 1. Each row represents a di¤erent outcome measure, while each column represents a di¤erent speci…cation. All regressions include …rm by industry, …rm by year, and industry by …rm …xed e¤ects, and are therefore comparable to the results presented in Table 4 (Column 5) and Table 5 .
Employment Weighted Regulation
In constructing Reg f it , I restricted the e¤ect of regulation to be identical for each of the …rm by industry's plants, regardless of the characteristics (such as the size) of the plant. This assumption is tenuous if, for example, a …rm …nds regulation more costly when its largest plant becomes subject to regulation. Alternatively, I weight each plant by its approximate employment (E pit ) when constructing the regulation variable, and replace Reg f it with an employment-weighted measure of regulation:
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The results, presented in Column 1 of Table 10 , remain robust: the regulation e¤ect on foreign capital stock and output are positive and signi…cant, while the e¤ect on sales is positive, but not precisely estimated.
Estimated Regulation Data
The EPA did not maintain data on the county-level designations between the years 1972 to 1977, and therefore, predicted data were used in the analysis for these years. However, as Appendix Table 10 , remain robust.
Lower Cutoff for Emissions Standards
I label an industry to be an "emitter" of a pollutant if the industry contributed 7% or more to industrial emissions of that pollutant. My analysis relies on the comparison between nonemitters and emitters, and, therefore, it is important that the assignment rule correctly classi…es industries, as misclassi…cation will bias the estimated regulation e¤ects. In Table 10 , Column 3, I present the estimation of Equation 1 where an industry is labeled an emitter if the industry has 32 I lack U.S. plant-level asset data. Otherwise, I would weight each U.S. plant by its assets when constructing the regulation variable in order to discern whether the decision to increase manufacturing abroad is a function of the size of the regulated plant. contributed 4.5% or more to industrial emissions. The results remain robust, largely because the change from the 7% to 4.5% cuto¤ does not cause many industries to ‡ip from the non-emitting to emitting category.
Varying Sample Construction
In Table 10 , Columns 4 and 5, I determine the sensitivity of the regulation estimates to sample construction. First, I re-estimate equation 1 for …rms that operated throughout the entire period. If the CAAA regulations caused …rms to shut down, and …rms who are anticipating closure make fewer foreign investments while alive, then the estimated regulation e¤ects would be biased downward. The point estimates of regulation (Column 4) are larger across all outcome measures (for example, the e¤ect on foreign assets is now 450 versus 329 in Table 4 ). However, …rms that operate throughout the entire period have higher mean FDI (the mean foreign assets is 44836). As such, the mean elasticity of FDI to regulation does not di¤er from the full sample.
Second, in the early years of regulation, the regulations were unanticipated. In later years, …rms for whom the regulations bind may have already left (or avoided) counties that had a high probability of falling into nonattainment. In this case, …rms remaining in nonattainment counties would be those with negligible marginal pollution abatement costs. As such, the estimated regression coe¢ cients would be systematically biased downward. In Column 5, I
limit the analysis to the early years of regulation (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) . While the point estimate of the coe¢ cient are smaller (for example, 136 on foreign assets), …rms also tended to invest less during this period (the mean foreign assets is 17,973). Hence, the mean elasticity during the early years of regulation is not signi…cantly di¤erent from the estimated elasticity for the entire 1966-1999 period.
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Discussion
The preceding empirical work provides evidence that U.S. based multinationals increased FDI in response to U.S. "clean air" policies. Speci…cally, my analysis suggests that the CAAA regulations caused the average multinational …rm to increase its foreign assets in polluting industries by 5% and its foreign output by 9%. These …ndings warrant additional discussion regarding their meaning and possible welfare implications. 33 Nonattainment designations in the early period are estimated due to missing data. As such, regulation estimates in earlier period contain more noise than in later periods.
Substitution of U.S. Manufacturing
The …ndings in this paper suggest that U.S. multinationals may substitute foreign for domestic production in response to U.S. regulations. In particular, I …nd that regulation causes …rms to increase both foreign production and intra-…rm trade. However, these substitution e¤ects are small relative to total multinational production in the United States.
I can compute the approximate percentage of U.S. multinational activity that this increased foreign production accounts for. The analysis predicts that U.S. multinationals will increase their foreign assets by 5.3% in polluting industries in response to the mean CAAA regulation. Therefore, for the year 1977, the regulations amounted to $52 billion of total foreign assets in polluting industries. 34 This increase represents approximately 0.6% of the stock of multinationals'domestic assets in polluting industries.
Comparison with Tax
Regulation impacts a …rm's production decisions by increasing the cost of domestic production, and can therefore be seen as a production tax. To determine whether the magnitude of the estimated regulation e¤ect is plausible, I can compare it with a rough estimate of how an "environmental tax"would impact FDI.
The best estimates currently place U.S. environmental compliance costs at 2% of the total cost of production (Ja¤e, et al, 1995) . Prior to the passage of CAAA, the United States had little environmental regulation, and, therefore, I assume that these costs are fully attributable to the CAAA regulation. Two percent of costs is roughly equal to 12% of a multinational's pro…ts (1999 BEA Data). Thus, the CAAA regulation can be viewed as equivalent to a 12% pro…t tax.
To my knowledge, an estimate of the tax elasticity of outbound investment is unavailable.
Instead, I use a measure of the inward tax elasticity of investment, -0.6, from Gorden and Hines (2002) as a proxy for the outbound elasticity. Thus, a 12% environmental tax is associated with a 6.8% increase in FDI, which is comparable in magnitude to the 5.3% estimate derived in this paper.
Welfare Implications
This study …nds that multinationals may circumvent environmental laws by manufacturing in alternative locations. Therefore, while country-level policies may reduce local pollution, they have the potential to leave the level of global pollution unchanged (or, perversely, even increase it), and may have important distributional consequences.
However, a comprehensive study on who gains (and who loses) from these policies is complicated by several factors. First and foremost, the analysis depends on whether one takes a global or a U.S. perspective. U.S. environmental policy shifts manufacturing (and, therefore, pollution) abroad. Some foreign countries may tolerate higher pollution levels in order to further economic growth (Krueger & Grossman, 1995) , and therefore, it is not obvious that countries receiving U.S. FDI experience a welfare loss from an increased presence of dirty industries.
From a U.S. perspective, environmental regulation reduces U.S. pollution levels and can provide signi…cant health bene…ts and general improvements in the quality of life. 35 On the other hand, these improvements may come at a substantial cost: the cost of production and employment shifting abroad, externalities from global pollution, and changes in the prices of consumer goods.
While this study aims to understand the costs of lost production, the calculated regulation e¤ects can only be used as a guide in determining these costs. First, this study does not capture all possible changes in foreign production. For example, suppose that domestic …rms cannot compete with foreign …rms after regulation. Foreign goods may therefore ‡ood the market (import substitution) causing U.S. …rms to shutdown. Second, I cannot fully predict the counterfactual. If …rms would have eventually shifted production abroad even in the absence of regulation (and the regulations simply speed up the process), the ensuing welfare e¤ects would be di¤erent than if the …rms move solely in response to regulation. Finally, even if production and jobs shifted abroad, one would expect labor and capital to be reallocated within the United States. As such, the true costs of regulation depend on the adjustment costs of switching resources to other sectors.
Conclusions
This paper provides new evidence on the relationship between environmental regulation and FDI. I …nd evidence that the Clean Air Act Regulations caused U.S. based multinational …rms 35 See Smith and Huang (1995) ; Henderson (1996) ; Chay and Greenstone (2003) ; Currie and Neidell (2004) .
to increase their foreign production in emitting industries. In particular, my analysis predicts that multinationals increased their foreign assets by 5.3% and their foreign output by 9% in response to tougher regulation. This increase accounted for roughly 0.6% of the multinationals' domestic assets in polluting industries. However, contrary to common claims, I …nd that heavily regulated …rms did not disproportionately increase foreign investment in developing countries.
This paper provides limited evidence that heavily regulated U.S. …rms increase imports from their foreign a¢ liates in response to regulation. In addition, I …nd robust evidence that …rms react more strongly to regulation when they operate in an industry where imports have historically accounted for a large percentage of U.S. consumption. On the whole, these results are consistent with the theory that regulation causes a …rm to substitute foreign for domestic production.
In light of the recent debates on outsourcing, my results suggest that American environmental regulations have contributed to the ‡ight of manufacturing. However, these results should not be misinterpreted as a criticism of environmental law nor a call to reverse environmental policy within the United States. Substantial research has shown that these policies are e¤ec-tive at reducing air pollution concentrations and that cleaner air provides substantial monetary bene…ts to homeowners and signi…cant health bene…ts. Thus, it is possible that the welfare gains from the shifting investment abroad may still outweigh the costs.
Appendix
To fully understand the construction of Reg f it ; consider the following example (Appendix Table   A2 Notes: (1) The entries are from regressions where the dependent variable is the listed variable of a firm in an industry at time "t" (56385 observations for 2235 firms). (2) All regressions computed using two way effects model, and standard errors are appropriately adjusted. (1) The entries are from regressions where the dependent variable is the listed variable of a firm in an industry at time "t" (56385 observations for 2235 firms). (2) All regressions computed using two way effects model, and standard errors are appropriately adjusted. 
